



Cyberscope

Audit Report

MegaCoin

February 2023

Type	BEP20
Network	BSC
Address	0x740293131c635b401b3C1aD5568306334b717729
Audited by	© cyberscope

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Review

Contract Name	MegaCoin
Compiler Version	v0.6.12+commit.27d51765
Optimization	200 runs
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/address/0x740293131c635b401b3c1ad5568306334b717729
Address	0x740293131c635b401b3c1ad5568306334b717729
Network	BSC
Symbol	MTG
Decimals	3
Total Supply	1,000,000,000

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	22 Feb 2023
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Source Files

Filename	SHA256
MegaCoin.sol	519c27a7c9328e6610abd5c6eb5f10b12a701ae4cbc9d753a9b2eebae2e865f3

Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative ● Pass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	ST	Stops Transactions	Passed
●	OCTD	Transfers Contract's Tokens	Passed
●	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
●	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
●	ULTW	Transfers Liquidity to Team Wallet	Passed
●	MT	Mints Tokens	Passed
●	BT	Burns Tokens	Passed
●	BC	Blacklists Addresses	Passed

Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	MFN	Misleading Function Naming	Unresolved
●	TSD	Total Supply Diversion	Unresolved
●	IRF	Insufficient Reward Funds	Unresolved
●	PTRP	Potential Transfer Revert Propagation	Unresolved
●	DDP	Decimal Division Precision	Unresolved
●	CO	Code Optimization	Unresolved
●	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant	Unresolved
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
●	L05	Unused State Variable	Unresolved
●	L09	Dead Code Elimination	Unresolved
●	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation	Unresolved
●	L16	Validate Variable Setters	Unresolved
●	L17	Usage of Solidity Assembly	Unresolved

●	L20	Succeeded Transfer Check	Unresolved
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MFN - Misleading Function Naming

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Status	Unresolved

Description

Functions can have misleading names if their names do not accurately reflect the functionality they contain or the purpose they serve. The contract uses some function names that do not clearly reflect the functions purpose and functionality. Misleading function names can lead to confusion, making the code more difficult to read and understand.

The function `_reflectFee` adds the fee amount of a transaction to the `_tFeeTotal` variable, which is the accumulated amount of fees collected by the contract. This functions name does not reflect its functionality in any way.

```
function _reflectFee(uint256 tFee) private {  
    _tFeeTotal = _tFeeTotal.add(tFee);  
}
```

Recommendation

It's always a good practice for the contract to contain function names that are specific and descriptive. The team is advised to keep in mind the readability of the code.

TSD - Total Supply Diversion

Criticality	Critical
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L653
Status	Unresolved

Description

The total supply of a token is the total number of tokens that have been created, while the balances of individual accounts represent the number of tokens that an account owns. The total supply and the balances of individual accounts are two separate concepts that are managed by different variables in a smart contract. These two entities should be equal to each other.

Within the contract, fees are partitioned into 5 distinct portions, with each portion being allocated to a corresponding wallet's balance. The precise amount of each portion is calculated using a percentage value. However, the sum of all percentage values is 9, with a divisor of 10. This arrangement results in a small fraction of the fee being excluded from the balance calculations. Consequently, the sum of all balances will not match the total supply.

```
MarketingShare=tFee.mul(_marketingPer).div(10);  
RewardShare=tFee.mul(_RewardPer).div(10);  
Buyback=tFee.mul(BuybackPer).div(10);  
devShare=tFee.mul(_devPer).div(10);  
lotShare=tFee.mul(_lotPer).div(10);
```

Recommendation

The total supply and the balance variables are separate and independent from each other. The total supply represents the total number of tokens that have been created, while the balance mapping stores the number of tokens that each account owns. The sum of balances should always equal the total supply.

IRF - Insufficient Reward Funds

Criticality	Critical
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L555
Status	Unresolved

Description

The reward pool in the contract can be used by users to claim rewards. Unfortunately, due to bugs in the reward formula, some users are unable to claim their rewards. To illustrate this issue, consider the following scenario:

- User A initiates a transfer, resulting in a reward pool of x .
- User B then transfers, increasing the pool to $x + y$.
- Finally, User C transfers, bringing the reward pool to $x + y + z$.
- When User B claims their reward, the user is able to take z , leaving $x + y$ in the pool.
- Subsequently, when User A claims reward, they user can take $y + z$, which will not be sufficient.

```
function claimReward() public {
    if(msg.sender!=pancakePair)
    {
        uint256 rewardPool=UserrewardPoolOnLastClaim[msg.sender];
        emit comments ("URP", UserrewardPoolOnLastClaim[msg.sender]);
        emit comments ("TRP",_rewardPool);
        emit comments ("AP",rewardPool);
        uint256 remainPool=_rewardPool-rewardPool;
        emit comments ("RP" , remainPool);

        if(remainPool>0 && balanceOf(msg.sender)>0 && exist[msg.sender]){
            uint256 userShare =
(balanceOf(msg.sender).mul(remainPool)).div(totalSupply());
            emit comments("balanceOf",balanceOf(msg.sender));
            emit comments ("rP",remainPool);
            emit comments ("TS",totalSupply());
            emit comments("uS line 595S", userShare);
            payable(msg.sender).transfer(userShare);
            _claimedRewardPool+=userShare;
            emit comments("_clad 597", _claimedRewardPool);
        }
        UserrewardPoolOnLastClaim[msg.sender]=_rewardPool;
        emit comments ("Uclaimed", UserrewardPoolOnLastClaim[msg.sender]);
        emit comments ("rP",_rewardPool);
    }
}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to carefully check the implementation of the `claimReward` function to ensure that all users are able to claim their share.

PTRP - Potential Transfer Revert Propagation

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L527
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract sends funds to the following address

- `markWallet`
- `buybackWallet`
- `devWallet`
- `lotteryWallet`

as part of the transfer flow. These addresses can either be a wallet address or a contract. If the address belongs to a contract then it may revert from incoming payment. As a result, the error will propagate to the token's contract and revert the transfer.

```
markWallet.transfer(MarketingBNB);  
buybackWallet.transfer(BuybackBNB);  
devWallet.transfer(devBNB);  
lotteryWallet.transfer(lotBNB);
```

Recommendation

The contract should tolerate the potential revert from the underlying contracts when the interaction is part of the main transfer flow. This could be achieved by not allowing set contract addresses or by sending the funds in a non-revertable way.

DDP - Decimal Division Precision

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L521
Status	Unresolved

Description

Division of decimal (fixed point) numbers can result in rounding errors due to the way that division is implemented in Solidity. Thus, it may produce issues with precise calculations with decimal numbers.

Solidity represents decimal numbers as integers, with the decimal point implied by the number of decimal places specified in the type (e.g. decimal with 18 decimal places). When a division is performed with decimal numbers, the result is also represented as an integer, with the decimal point implied by the number of decimal places in the type. This can lead to rounding errors, as the result may not be able to be accurately represented as an integer with the specified number of decimal places.

Hence, the splitted shares will not have the exact precision and some funds may not be calculated as expected.

```
uint256 SplitBNBBalance =  
Balance.div(_marketingPer.add(_RewardPer).add(BuybackPer).add(_devPer).add(_lotPer));  
uint256 MarketingBNB=SplitBNBBalance.mul(_marketingPer);  
uint256 BuybackBNB=SplitBNBBalance.mul(BuybackPer);  
uint256 devBNB=SplitBNBBalance.mul(_devPer);  
uint256 lotBNB=SplitBNBBalance.mul(_lotPer);  
uint256 RewardBNB=SplitBNBBalance.mul(_RewardPer);
```

Recommendation

The contract could calculate the subtraction of the divided funds in the last calculation in order to avoid the division rounding issue.

CO - Code Optimization

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L485
Status	Unresolved

Description

There are code segments that could be optimized. A segment may be optimized so that it becomes a smaller size, consumes less memory, executes more rapidly, or performs fewer operations.

During a transaction the contract checks the sender's and recipient's address if they match `pancakePair` address. Since the previous checks at the `if-else if` block already check equality between these addresses, the last check is redundant as it will always be true. Hence, an `else` block will be sufficient.

```
else if(from != pancakePair && to != pancakePair)
{
    takeFee = false;
    TaxType=0;
}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to take into consideration these segments and rewrite them so the runtime will be more performant. That way it will improve the efficiency and performance of the source code and reduce the cost of executing it.

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L117,344,345,346,354,355,356,357,358,368
Status	Unresolved

Description

State variables can be declared as constant using the constant keyword. This means that the value of the state variable cannot be changed after it has been set. Additionally, the constant variables decrease gas consumption of the corresponding transaction.

```
address private _previousOwner
string private _name = "Mega Coin"
string private _symbol = "MTG"
uint8 private _decimals = 3
uint256 public _marketingPer = 3
uint256 public _RewardPer = 2
uint256 public BuybackPer=1
uint256 public _devPer=2
uint256 public _lotPer=1
uint256 private minTokensBeforeSwap = 100
```

Recommendation

Constant state variables can be useful when the contract wants to ensure that the value of a state variable cannot be changed by any function in the contract. This can be useful for storing values that are important to the contract's behavior, such as the contract's address or the maximum number of times a certain function can be called. The team is advised to add the constant keyword to state variables that never change.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L172,173,187,205,341,348,349,350,351,352,354,355,356,357,358,370,372,543,580,599,643,713,718,722,727,735,741,748,752,756
Status	Unresolved

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.

```
function DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() external view returns (bytes32);
function PERMIT_TYPEHASH() external pure returns (bytes32);
function MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY() external pure returns (uint);
function WETH() external pure returns (address);
address[] private _ExcludedFromReward
mapping (address => uint) public UserLastSellTimeStamp
mapping (address => uint256) public UserrewardPoolOnLastClaim
uint256 public _rewardPool
uint256 public _claimedRewardPool
uint256 public _TaxFee = 9
uint256 public _marketingPer = 3
uint256 public _RewardPer = 2
uint256 public BuybackPer=1
uint256 public _devPer=2
...
```

Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention>.

L05 - Unused State Variable

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L117,341
Status	Unresolved

Description

An unused state variable is a state variable that is declared in the contract, but is never used in any of the contract's functions. This can happen if the state variable was originally intended to be used, but was later removed or never used.

Unused state variables can create clutter in the contract and make it more difficult to understand and maintain. They can also increase the size of the contract and the cost of deploying and interacting with it.

```
address private _previousOwner  
address[] private _ExcludedFromReward
```

Recommendation

To avoid creating unused state variables, it's important to carefully consider the state variables that are needed for the contract's functionality, and to remove any that are no longer needed. This can help improve the clarity and efficiency of the contract.

L09 - Dead Code Elimination

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L70,77,82,85,88,91,95
Status	Unresolved

Description

In Solidity, dead code is code that is written in the contract, but is never executed or reached during normal contract execution. Dead code can occur for a variety of reasons, such as:

- Conditional statements that are always false.
- Functions that are never called.
- Unreachable code (e.g., code that follows a return statement).

Dead code can make a contract more difficult to understand and maintain, and can also increase the size of the contract and the cost of deploying and interacting with it.

```
function isContract(address account) internal view returns (bool) {
    bytes32 codehash;
    bytes32 accountHash =
0xc5d2460186f7233c927e7db2dcc703c0e500b653ca82273b7bfad8045d85a470;
    //solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly
    assembly { codehash := extcodehash(account) }
    return (codehash != accountHash && codehash != 0x0);
}

function sendValue(address payable recipient, uint256 amount) internal {
    require(address(this).balance >= amount, "Address: insufficient balance");
    (bool success, ) = recipient.call{ value: amount }("");
    require(success, "Address: unable to send value, recipient may have
reverted");
}

...
```

Recommendation

To avoid creating dead code, it's important to carefully consider the logic and flow of the contract and to remove any code that is not needed or that is never executed. This can help improve the clarity and efficiency of the contract.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L521,522,523,524,525,526
Status	Unresolved

Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
uint256 SplitBNBBalance =  
Balance.div(_marketingPer.add(_RewardPer).add(BuybackPer).add(_devPer).add(_lotPer))  
uint256 lotBNB=SplitBNBBalance.mul(_lotPer)
```

Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

L16 - Validate Variable Setters

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L687,714,719,723,728,737,749,753,757
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract performs operations on variables that have been configured on user-supplied input. These variables are missing of proper check for the case where a value is zero. This can lead to problems when the contract is executed, as certain actions may not be properly handled when the value is zero.

```
takeMain=payable(addr)  
markWallet = wallet  
buybackWallet = wallt  
devWallet = wallet  
lotteryWallet = wallt  
_toAddrress.transfer(address(this).balance)  
RewardHolder.transfer(RewardAmnt)  
DivRewardHolder.transfer(RewardAmnt)  
holder.transfer(RewardAmnt)
```

Recommendation

By adding the proper check, the contract will not allow the variables to be configured with zero value. This will ensure that the contract can handle all possible input values and avoid unexpected behavior or errors. Hence, it can help to prevent the contract from being exploited or operating unexpectedly.

L17 - Usage of Solidity Assembly

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L74,102
Status	Unresolved

Description

Using assembly can be useful for optimizing code, but it can also be error-prone. It's important to carefully test and debug assembly code to ensure that it is correct and does not contain any errors.

Some common types of errors that can occur when using assembly in Solidity include Syntax, Type, Out-of-bounds, Stack, and Revert.

```
assembly { codehash := extcodehash(account) }

assembly {
    let returndata_size := mload(returndata)
    revert(add(32, returndata), returndata_size)
}
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to use assembly sparingly and only when necessary, as it can be difficult to read and understand compared to Solidity code.

L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	MegaCoin.sol#L745
Status	Unresolved

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
tokenContract.transferFrom(address(this), buybackWallet, _amount)
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the [Openzeppelin library](#).

Functions Analysis

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
	_msgSender	Internal		
	_msgData	Internal		
IERC20	Interface			
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
SafeMath	Library			
	add	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	sub	Internal		
	mul	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	div	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
	mod	Internal		
Address	Library			
	isContract	Internal		

	sendValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCall	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	functionCallWithValue	Internal	✓	
	_functionCallWithValue	Private	✓	
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
		Internal	✓	
	owner	Public		-
	renounceOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	transferOwnership	Public	✓	onlyOwner
IPancakeFactory	Interface			
	feeTo	External		-
	feeToSetter	External		-
	getPair	External		-
	allPairs	External		-
	allPairsLength	External		-
	createPair	External	✓	-
	setFeeTo	External	✓	-
	setFeeToSetter	External	✓	-
IPancakePair	Interface			
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	decimals	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-


	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External		-
	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External		-
	nonces	External		-
	permit	External	✓	-
	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External		-
	factory	External		-
	token0	External		-
	token1	External		-
	getReserves	External		-
	price0CumulativeLast	External		-
	price1CumulativeLast	External		-
	kLast	External		-
	mint	External	✓	-
	burn	External	✓	-
	swap	External	✓	-
	skim	External	✓	-
	sync	External	✓	-
	initialize	External	✓	-
IPancakeRouter01	Interface			
	factory	External		-
	WETH	External		-
	addLiquidity	External	✓	-
	addLiquidityETH	External	Payable	-
	removeLiquidity	External	✓	-

	removeLiquidityETH	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokens	External	✓	-
	swapTokensForExactTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapTokensForExactETH	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForETH	External	✓	-
	swapETHForExactTokens	External	Payable	-
	quote	External		-
	getAmountOut	External		-
	getAmountIn	External		-
	getAmountsOut	External		-
	getAmountsIn	External		-
IPancakeRouter02	Interface	IPancakeRouter01		
	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	Payable	-
	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External	✓	-
MegaCoin	Implementation	Context, IERC20, Ownable		
		Public	✓	-
	name	Public		-
	symbol	Public		-


	decimals	Public		-
	totalSupply	Public		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	Public	✓	-
	allowance	Public		-
	approve	Public	✓	-
	transferFrom	Public	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	decreaseAllowance	Public	✓	-
	totalFees	Public		-
	_approve	Private	✓	
	_transfer	Private	✓	
	swapAndLiquify	Private	✓	
	myRewards	Public		-
	claimReward	Public	✓	-
	swapTokensForEth	Private	✓	
	_tokenTransfer	Private	✓	
	_transferStandard	Private	✓	
	_getValues	Private		
	_getTValues	Private		
	calculateTaxFee	Private		
	_takeMarketingFee	Private	✓	
	_reflectFee	Private	✓	
	resetAllFee	Private	✓	
	restoreAllFee	Private	✓	
	verifyClaim	Public	✓	-
	updateClaimOwner	External	✓	onlyOwner
	burn	Public	✓	-
	excludeFromFee	External	✓	onlyOwner

	includeInFee	External	✓	onlyOwner
	isExcludedFromFee	Public		-
	_burn	Internal	✓	
	Wallet_Update_Marketing	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	Wallet_Update	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	Wallet_Update_dev	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	Wallet_Update_lot	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	GetAlls	External	✓	onlyOwner
	GetOne	External	✓	onlyOwner
	RewardLiqProvider	External	✓	onlyOwner
	DividendsRewards	External	✓	onlyOwner
	GiftsToHolders	External	✓	onlyOwner
		External	Payable	-

Inheritance Graph



Flow Graph



Summary

MegaCoin is an interesting project that has a friendly and growing community. The Smart Contract analysis reported no compiler errors. The contract Owner can access some admin functions that can not be used in a malicious way to disturb the users' transactions. The analysis reported two critical issues, regarding the total supply and balances diversion, as described in detail at the [TSD](#) section, and the rewards calculation formula, as described in detail at the [IRF](#) section. There is also a limit of max 9% fees.

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Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. Cyberscope's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. Cyberscope's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze. The assessment services provided by Cyberscope are subject to dependencies and are under continuing development. You agree that your access and/or use including but not limited to any services reports and materials will be at your sole risk on an as-is where-is and as-available basis. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies and carry with them high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives, false negatives and other unpredictable results. The services may access and depend upon multiple layers of third parties.

About Cyberscope

Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



The Cyberscope team

<https://www.cyberscope.io>